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Abstract
We experimentally test the hypothesis that playersvaluations of a
game coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results o¤er
signicantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of
Dominant Strategy (DS) play.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we report results from an experiment designed to test whether
subjective valuations of a given (sub)game coincide with Nash equilibrium
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payo¤s. This apparently straightforward consequence of individual rationality
plays a central role in game theory, being especially useful in the determination
of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.1Contrary to this prediction, almost half
of our subjects either under- or over-value a symmetric prisoners dilemma
game2.Our ndings suggest that such deviations are weakly related with a
lower percentage of Dominant Strategy (DS) play, which nevertheless, receives
systematic support by our results. While no correlation is found between
scores in Ravens (1976) non verbal intelligence test and elicited game values,
the frequency of dominated strategy play negatively correlates with subjects
scores in the aforementioned test.
2 Experimental Design
The results reported here were obtained from a single experimental session at
the Laboratori dEconomia Experimental (LEE, Spain). Participants (N=66)
were undergraduate students of Business Administration at the Universitat
Jaume I (Castellón, Spain). Before participating in the main experiment, sub-
jects were faced with Ravens psychometric test of non verbal intelligence, con-
sidered by psychologists as good predictor of performance in decision making
tasks.
Subjects were informed that all their monetary rewards would be calcu-
lated on the basis of their performance in the main experiment alone.3The
main experiment is based on the following two-stage game. In the rst-stage
subgame, which is labelled as a proposal to merge with ones opponent, play-
ers choose strategies from the pair fM;NMg ({Merger, No Merger}). A
merger takes place if both players simultaneously propose to merge (M) and
the game is over. Then, both players earn X Euros, for which 7 alternative
values are used in a payment card, incentive-compatible elicitation format,
where X 2 f25; 19; 17:5; 16:8; 15:8; 15; 10g. Otherwise, players enter into the
second-stage subgame, which is labelled as a game of reciprocal entry into each
others market. Each subject chooses a strategy from fE;NEg ({Entry, No
Entry}). The payo¤s of this subgame are given in the following matrix:
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[Insert Table 1 here]
Two di¤erent values of B were used: A relatively high (B = 12:5) and
a relatively low one (B = 1). In both cases, this subgames payo¤s yield a
prisoners dilemma whose dominant strategy equilibrium leads to a reciprocal
entry by both players into each others market. Observe that the 7 values of
X, corresponding to the merger, range from well above to well below the value
of individual payo¤s in the DS equilibrium.
We have used the strategy method, asking subjects to simultaneously post
their strategies in both subgames, for each one of the 14 scenarios resulting
from the combinations between each one of the 7 values of X and the two
values of B.4
Once strategies were posted, one of the 14 scenarios was randomly chosen
to be the binding one. Finally, 33 pairs of subjects were randomly formed and
each ones payo¤ was determined according to the two playersstrategies in
the chosen scenario.
3 Hypotheses and Results
Our results are based on two types of observations. First, a subjects mini-
mum value of X for which he/she prefers the merger to the earnings of the
entry subgame. These data are labelled as the subjects valuation of the entry
subgame. Second, subjectsstrategies in the entry subgame. We label data
generated under the 2 di¤erent values of B using the term subseries(B=12.5:
rst subseries, B=1: second subseries).
Our hypotheses are the following:
H1: Subjects will switchfrom NM to M at the lowest value of X exceed-
ing 17.
Subsequently, we will refer to entry-subgame valuations deviating from this
pattern as under- (over-)valuations, depending on whether subjects switch to
the merger for a lower (higher) X than that postulated in H1.
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H2: Subjects elicited valuations of the entry subgame should remain in-
variant across di¤erent values of the dominated strategy payo¤.
That is, within-subject comparison of strategies in the merger subgame
should not exhibit signicant di¤erences across subseries.
H3: In the entry subgame, subjects will play the dominant strategy (E).
We classify subjects into three groups according to their decisions in the
merger subgame. Group 2 consists of those who adopt the merger for all the
values of X strictly exceeding Nash equilibrium payo¤s of the entry subgame
(17) and for only them, that is X 2 f25; 19; 17:5g. Group 1 consists of subjects
proposing the merger for a strict subset of the aforementioned values, imply-
ing an overvaluation of the entry subgame. Analogously, group 3 consists of
subjects willing to merge for a broader spectrum of values of X than the afore-
mentioned ones, including values lying below Nash equilibrium payo¤s in the
entry subgame. In Table 2 we present the percentages of subjects that are
included in each group, for each one of the two subseries. For each group, we
also include the percentage of subjects playing the dominant strategy, E.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Observe in table 2 that H1 is conrmed by only (approximately) 50% of
the subjects. The rest of them overvalueor undervaluethe game and the
percentage of the former signicantly5decreases (from 22.7% to 9.11%) in the
presence of a lower dominated strategy payo¤6, implying a violation of H2.
Let us move now to strategies adopted in the game of entries. Aggregating
decisions in the game of entries, around 85% of them conrmH3. In fact, 73%
of the subjects have played the dominant strategy in all scenarios. From table
2 we can see that the highest frequencies (respectively, 96:16% and 91:13%)
of dominant strategy play coincides (for both subseries) with the population
of subjects whose valuation of the game is equal to Nash equilibrium payo¤s.
However, no signicant correlation7was found between strategies in the game
of entries and elicited valuations. Interestingly, we nd a positive correlation
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(Spearmans  = 0:316;  = 0:05) between a subjects performance in Ravens
test and the number of scenarios in which the subject has played the dominant
strategy. This may imply that not choosing the dominant strategy in the game
of entries may be simply the result of a low capacity in decision making tasks.
On the contrary, no correlation was found between scores in Ravens test and
merger decisions, implying that the reported over- and under-valuations of the
subgame of entries cannot be simply attributed to the subjectslow decision-
making abilities.
4 Conclusions
We have reported an experiment designed to test whether human subjects
valuations of a prisonersdilemma game coincide (as assumed, for example,
when backward induction is used to obtain a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium)
with subjectsNash equilibrium payo¤s. The hypothesis is contradicted by
approximately half of our subjects. Subjects conrming the predicted valua-
tion exhibit higher frequencies of dominant strategy play, which is conrmed
by the majority of our subjects. Finally, dominated strategy play signicantly
correlates with low scoring in Ravens (1976) non verbal intelligence test.
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Notes:
1. See, for example, seminal papers by Selten (1975) and Kreps and Wilson
(1982).
2. Early experimental studies by Flood (1952), Lave (1962) and Rapoport
and Chammah (1965) have reported results on behavior in prisonersdilemma
games, but the issue of game valuation has not been isolated from behavior
itself.
3. Instructions are available upon request.
4. The corresponding 14 screens were presented to the subjects in a random
sequence -di¤erent for each subject-, in order for ordering e¤ects to be avoided.
5. A Wilcoxon (p = 0:018) and a sign test (p = 0:017) conrm this result
at a signicance level  = 0:05
6. This is an aggregate result, while within-subject examination indicates
that a small percentage (5%) of subjects shifted across scenarios on the oppo-
site direction.
7. Both Spearman and Pearson correlation coe¢ cients were non signicant
at a 0.05 level of signicance.
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Player A
Player B
Entry No Entry
Entry 17 , 17 22 , B
No Entry B , 22 18 , 18
Table 1 : Payo¤s (in Euros) for the Game of Entries. B 2 f1; 12:5g
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Subseries 1 (B=12.5) Subseries 2 (B=1)
% of E % of E
Group 1 (over) 22.7% 84.76% 9.1% 75.24%
Group 2 (DS Eq.) 51.5% 96.16% 57.6% 91.13%
Group 3 (under) 25.8% 73.28% 33.3% 81.30%
Table 2 : Distribution of Elicited Valuations and Percentage of DS Play
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